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ABSTRACT
In a climate where the work of the legal profession is changing and evolving rapidly,
this article considers the potential for empathy to be incorporated as an essential
element of legal practice. This challenges the conceptions of legal practice held by
many legal professionals and law students but draws on increasing scientific
evidence demonstrating the interaction between cognition and affect and reflects
the emotional realities of life in practice. This article will consider the different
definitions of empathy and argue that it is necessary for it to be conceptualised in a
way which draws upon both cognitive and affective elements. When empathy is
interpreted in this way it can provide both a more effective form of practice and a
deeper appreciation of ethics and values. This article will argue that to incorporate
empathy in this way requires a richer, more nuanced consideration of the benefits
and challenges involved in its use. However, embedding it throughout legal
education, training and legal practice would more than reward such a careful
evaluation of its role.
Introduction
Over recent years, the concept of empathy and the role and scope of legal practice
within society have both, individually, received increasing attention.1 However,
the relationship between the two remains relatively unexplored, particularly in
the context of the United Kingdom. The first part of the article will consider lit-
erature relating to empathy with the aim of determining its meaning and how it is
operationalised. The next part of the article will discuss whether empathy should
form part of legal practice, focusing on both the benefits and the challenges and
obstacles presented in the utilisation of empathy in this field. The final part of
the article will briefly consider how empathy might be introduced to law students
as a key element of legal education and training. Overall, this article will argue that
empathy has the potential to provide a valuable method to marry together the
affective and cognitive domains, and enable a more developed consideration of
ethics and values, in a way which enhances legal practice. However, it is also
acknowledged that empathy’s use in this way requires a careful unpacking of its
possible role and influence.
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There is a significant academic literature in the United States arguing for
empathy’s incorporation as a core lawyering skill that is required in order to
put into practice all other lawyering skills (see, for example, Henderson, 1987;
Rosenberg, 2002; Gerdy, 2008; Gallacher, 2012). In the UK, although overall
there appears to have been less debate generated, the Legal Education and Train-
ing Review (LETR) did refer to the word empathy (equating it with ‘comforting’
and ‘caring’ skills) and identified it as a core legal competency (2013, para. 4.85
and table 4.3). This has, in turn, been reflected in the Bar Standards Board’s ‘Pro-
fessional Statement for Barristers’, which requires practitioners to “know how
and where to demonstrate empathy, and act accordingly” (BSB, 2016, rule 3.4).
Despite increasing usage of the term empathy, it is questionable whether the
concept has truly become accepted, much less embedded, as a part of legal prac-
tice within the UK. This is arguably because, although empathy is not itself an
emotion, it does involve an emotional reaction and traditionally emotions and
the affective domain overall have been denied a place in the practice of law (Hen-
derson, 1987, p. 1575; Maroney, 2006; Abrams & Keren, 2010; Grossi, 2015).
Emotions have been seen as antithetical to law, with law aligning itself with cog-
nition, and therefore reason and rationality. In contrast, emotions have been
seen as being related to bodily functions and therefore unpredictable and
often illogical in nature (Maroney, 2006; Grossi, 2015). As a result, the dominant
view has been that emotion and emotional reactions should not feature within
legal practice (Binder et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, there are those lawyers who maintain that the distinction
between reason and emotion is not only impossible but also detrimental to
the practice of law (Silver, 1999; Lange, 2002; Montgomery, 2008; Bandes,
2011–2012; Flower, 2014). The increasing weight of scientific evidence and phi-
losophical argument demonstrates that affect (including emotions) and cogni-
tion are intertwined and attempting to separate the two creates a false
dichotomy which impoverishes and impairs reasoning and decision making in
all spheres of life (see, for example, Nussbaum, 2001; Damasio, 2006; Scherer,
2011; Keltner et al., 2013). This is reflected in literature, particularly from the
US, which ranges from discussion of emotional intelligence and competencies
through to wider movements, such as the comprehensive law movement and
the (somewhat intertwined) integrative law movement (Silver, 1999; Daicoff,
2006; Wright, 2016).
In recent years, the role and scope of legal practice within society has been
increasingly debated. Within the UK, the last thirty years have seen significant
shifts leading to the legal landscape changing beyond recognition (Sommerlad,
2007). For example, Sommerlad et al. discuss the “radical changes” that have
occurred within legal services and suggest that they “raise the question of
whether we still have an independent legal profession” (2015, p. 20; see also
Webb, 2008). The Legal Services Act 2007 has led to the creation of an “alterna-
tive legal services market” whereby non-reserved legal services can be provided
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by a wide range of unregulated individuals and organisations (Solicitors Regu-
lation Authority (SRA), n.d., p. 6). This Act also enabled the formation of
alternative business structures, designed to generate more innovative forms of
practice, and allow legal service providers access to external investment, as
well as creating opportunities for collaboration with non-lawyers (SRA, n.d.).
There has been an exponential growth of the corporate sector (Sommerlad,
2007). At the same time, legal aid has been drastically cut as a result of a
move away from collective welfare provision (Melville & Laing, 2007; Sommer-
lad, 2007). Hence, law firms are seeking to reinvent themselves to ensure their
survival in a competitive, business-focused environment. Such substantial
changes raise very real challenges for legal practice, but arguably also provide
significant opportunities for re-examining traditional lawyering paradigms.
Given this, the question this article focuses on is whether empathy should
now form an explicit part of legal practice and, if so, how?
What is empathy?
In psychological terms, empathy is notoriously difficult to define (Turner, 2012).
Indeed, Bandes maintains that “on close scrutiny it resembles a moving target”
(1996, p. 373). Within the scientific literature, Batson (2011) has identified eight
different uses of the concepts, which range from an understanding of another
person’s feelings to a sense of distress caused by another’s suffering to effectively
putting yourself in the other person’s shoes. Nevertheless, there does appear to
be a more general consensus that there are two levels of empathy. First, what
Goldman has termed a “lower-level” (2006, p. 140; see also Coplan & Goldie,
2011, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv), which has been described as akin to, or even a form
of, emotional contagion. In other words, this level involves a form of emotional
reaction, intuitively (and possibly unknowingly) picking up on and emulating
the emotion of another, for example from facial cues (Eisenberg et al., 1991,
p. 65; Hatfield et al., 2011). This form of empathy can also be described as
‘emotional empathy’, ‘affective empathy’ or ‘mirroring’, the latter due to its trig-
gering of mirror neutrons – the same regions in the brain will be activated in
both the person feeling empathy and the individual who is the object of their
attention (Bråten, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011, p. 18; Chrysikou & Thompson,
2016; Praszkier, 2016).
The second level of empathy is termed “higher level” by Goldman (2006,
p. 140) but has also been described as “cognitive” (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011,
p. 18). It involves some form of role or perspective taking by an individual:
an imaginative process which involves them thinking about the experience
of the person they are empathising with from that person’s perspective. At
the same time, the individual who is empathising will maintain a clear dis-
tinction between their own self and that of the object of their empathy,
known as “self–other differentiation” (Coplan, 2011, p. 15). Although there
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has been some debate in the scientific literature, the general consensus
appears to be that both levels of empathy can, to some extent at least, be
taught and developed as a body of skills (Stepian & Baernstein, 2006;
Jeffrey & Downie, 2016).
Probably the most cited definitions of empathy within legal circles are con-
tained in Henderson’s seminal work on empathy and legal regulation. Hender-
son encapsulates the plethora of literature on the phenomena captured by the
word empathy in three separate categories:
(1) feeling the emotion of another; (2) understanding the experience or situation of
another, both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself in the
position of the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of
another (hence the confusion of empathy with sympathy and compassion). (1987,
p. 1579)2
The ﬁrst understanding of empathy presented by Henderson captures the lower
level form of empathy previously discussed, which can be deﬁned as “an obser-
ver’s emotional response to the affective state of others” (Rogers, cited in
Gerarda Brown, 2012, p. 189). The literature dealing with empathy in relation
to legal professionals rarely discusses empathy in this way, arguably because it
is viewed, akin to other forms of emotional response, as dangerous and irrational
and thus antithetical to the practice of law.3
Certainly, it can be seen that incorporating solely this form of empathy into
legal practice and notions of professionalism would result in both conceptual
and practical problems. At a conceptual level, Henderson (1987) talks about
how an emotional state in another person might be mislabelled as a result of
emotional empathy mistaking one feeling for another, for example fear and
anger, and how this can lead to inaccurate empathy or what Morton (2011,
p. 138) describes as “pretend empathy”. There is also the question of to what
extent an individual can empathise with feelings they themselves have never
experienced (Matravers, 2011). At a practical level, there are also expectations
of the legal profession in terms of objectivity and impartiality. It is arguable
that an overly emotional response to a client could cloud the judgement of a
legal professional, leading them to act in an inappropriate or biased manner
that hampers resolution of the legal issue and is unwanted by the client (see
Duffy, 2010, in relation to mediation).
The second understanding of empathy presented by Henderson (1987)
equates to the previous description of upper level empathy, in that it includes
not only a form of emotional response but also a cognitive element of under-
standing derived from imagining the situation from the perspective of the
object of your empathy. In other words, it is “the process of understanding
another person’s perspective” (Rogers, cited in Gerarda Brown, 2012, p. 195).
This is where interpretation of that emotional state and what it means for the
person experiencing it is important. Often it is this second meaning of
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empathy that is employed (or, at least, advocated) in relation to legal practice
(Rosenberg, 2002; Duffy, 2010; Gerarda Brown, 2012).
An issue with this type of empathy is that it has been characterised as entirely
separate from lower level, emotional or affective empathy. Gerarda Brown
suggests that, within legal dispute resolution, it is this form of cognitive
empathy that dominates (2012).4 Margulies (1999), writing in relation to clinical
legal education, echoes this and suggests there is a focus on empathy in client
interviewing as a value-neutral, instrumental strategy. Consequently, both at a
conceptual and operational level, empathy can be operationalised as a passive
activity – the interviewer is perceived as responding from a separate vantage
point which is outside both their own and the client’s experience. This allows
the lawyer to avoid involving their own judgement or values.
Margulies argues that this renders the ‘empathy’ in these situations too uni-
versal in nature, resulting in a lack of appreciation of the client’s ‘inner world’
(ibid., p. 609). Effectively, it becomes a communication tool, rather than a way
of fostering deeper understanding and insight. Gerarda Brown (2012) acknowl-
edges that this form of cognitive empathy, or perspective-taking, can be ben-
eficial in that it “facilitates communication and improves the quality and
creativity of problem-solving” (p. 200). However, she also argues that lower
level empathy offers additional benefits that cognitive empathy alone cannot
achieve in further strengthening the lawyer–client relationship by encouraging
trust, as the client knows that their experience resonates with the lawyer. In con-
flict situations it can also provide an affirmation to the opponent that their
experience and feelings have been acknowledged (Gerarda Brown, 2012).
What Gerarda Brown, Margulies and others are advocating is a form of
empathy which utilises both emotional and cognitive processes, thus reflecting
the second type of empathy described by Henderson (1987).
This approach fits in well with the growing understanding that emotion and
cognition are intertwined, and avoids creating a new form of dualism between
the two in line with other multidimensional and integrated approaches
(Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Lower level empathy alone may prove misguided and
perhaps inappropriate in legal settings. A solely cognitive form of empathy is
impoverished and lacks the full benefits of a broader definition. Drawing the
two together provides the authentic element of feeling whilst also retaining
the cognitive element which is likely to appeal to lawyers and enable them to
accommodate empathy within the profession’s culture, values and ethics. As
such, it arguably provides a form of bridge which enables them to access the
affective domain in a way which is both effective but controlled.
The third meaning of empathy put forward by Henderson (1987) relates to
sympathy, care and compassion. This draws on Hoffman’s (2000, p. 63)
“empathic distress” response, which is a form of emotional empathy whereby
the person empathising with another feels discomfort resulting from the fact
that the other person is in a distressing situation. Hoffman argues that this
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response may function as a helping or altruistic response, although he also
emphasises that this is not always the case. Indeed, Nussbaum suggests that
empathy is ethically neutral as “a good sadist or torturer has to be highly empa-
thetic, to understand what would cause his or her victim maximal pain” (2006,
p. 321).
Regardless of whether empathy as a concept is ethically or value neutral, it has
been argued that its application within legal practice should be used in order to
present a caring attitude towards the client (Menkel-Meadow, 1992; Gerdy,
2008). This leads to the question of how it can best be incorporated within
legal practice.
Incorporating empathy into legal practice
Despite efforts to separate emotion from cognition, and regardless of whether or
how it is acknowledged or responded to, empathy does play a role in everyday
legal practice (Melville & Laing, 2007; Westaby, 2010; Westaby, 2014).
Lawyers are humans and therefore inevitably have both emotional and cognitive
responses to issues, even if they seek to suppress or disregard them (Gerdy, 2008;
Duffy, 2010). Indeed, there is evidence that attempting to stifle any form of
emotion within legal practice, resulting in surface acting, is both unsuccessful
and potentially psychologically harmful, leading to burnout in some cases
(Harris, 2002; Westaby, 2010; James, 2014). Similarly, clients will have an
emotional involvement in their own case, regardless of the area of law involved
(Barkai & Fine, 1983). For example, a business person may feel embarrassed at
an oversight or worried about the potential consequences of a claim. Even if the
case itself appears fairly emotionally neutral, the very nature of consulting with,
or instructing, a lawyer is likely to engender an emotional reaction in the client.
As Barkai and Fine assert, “Most people are probably less eager to see a lawyer
than to see a doctor” (1983, p. 510).
As discussed above, Gerarda Brown (2012) views empathy as important in
relation to lawyer–client relationships. There appears to be a general acceptance
that empathy assists with the building of rapport, trust and confidence and
therefore is particularly useful when interviewing clients. Indeed, mention is
made of it in textbooks designed to assist law students in developing interview-
ing skills. For example, in the Legal Practice Guide, Skills for Lawyers (Elkington
et al., 2015) reference is made to the need to acknowledge a client’s feelings by
saying ‘I can quite see why you feel angry about this’. By responding in this way
Elkington et al. (2015) suggest that the lawyer is in fact involved in “expressing
empathy with the client’s feelings; not being judgemental about them”
(s.11.5.1.5).
Binder et al. (2004) maintain that the legal profession viewing itself as a body
of rational fact gatherers focused on decision making rather than on client’s feel-
ings has led to ineffective lawyering. They argue that empathy is the “real mortar
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of an attorney–client (indeed any) relationship” (p. 49). Therefore, it is impor-
tant for a lawyer to listen to, understand and accept a client’s feelings as well as
understand the link between the problems of clients and the emotions they feel
(Binder et al., 2004).
Similarly, Genty (2000; see also Gerarda Brown, 2012) regards empathy as a
central skill possessed by legal professionals which enables the gaining of a
client’s trust. Barkai and Fine argue that “rapport, or a mutual trust, is…
central to a good client–professional relationship, and the most basic of the con-
ditions in creating this rapport is empathy” (1983, p. 511; see also Gerdy, 2008).
This rapport, in turn, allows the legal professional to develop an understanding
of the solutions required by the client (Barkai & Fine, 1983). It is this connection
provided by the employment of empathy which allows the lawyer to access all
the other skills required to satisfactorily represent the client (Genty, 2000;
Gerdy, 2008).
Using empathy within dispute resolution can be similarly advantageous as it
enables a lawyer to better understand their client’s ultimate goals; for example,
by encouraging them to question whether they require their maximum entitle-
ment, or if they would rather preserve some form of relationship or other value
that is important to them by seeking a compromise (Barkai & Fine, 1983). It can
assist with a client’s understanding and acceptance of how and why a particular
outcome was reached (ibid.; see also Gerdy, 2008) and aid the lawyer in dealing
with opponents by allowing them to demonstrate a genuine insight into the
opposing stances that have been taken:
Even if individuals and the lawyers who represent them must ultimately reject or put
aside the world view that animates opponents’ positions in conflict, chances for resol-
ution – for lasting peace – may increase if the opponents know that the other side has
been willing to enter their world, see their perspective, and feel how important the
issues are. (Gerarda Brown, 2012, p. 196)
It can also be used more generally to communicate effectively and persuasively
with jurors, judges and other lawyers, and other third parties such as witnesses
by utilising the empathetic connection created as a tool to shape the approach
used (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Gallacher, 2012). Although, as above, it
could be argued that this is simply utilising empathy as a form of communi-
cation strategy.
Despite these significant advantages related to the use of empathy, there are
also challenges and obstacles to it becoming an accepted part of legal practice.
The legal profession has traditionally valued “adherence to codes of conduct,
duties to the court and respect for client confidentiality”, notions which gener-
ally lack emotional content (Barton & Westwood, 2011, p. 237). Focus remains
on the rules and ethical codes of conduct rather than the “development of attri-
butes such as moral character” (ibid.). The reason for this has already been dealt
with in some part in the introduction, and goes back to the historical dichotomy
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between rationality and cognitive decision making and the perceived irrational-
ity of emotion and affect. Although, as discussed above, there are signs of its
increasing acceptance, such as its explicit inclusion in the Bar’s ‘Professional
Statement for Barristers’ (2016), this is still arguably limited.
Even for those legal scholars who maintain that empathy is an important and/
or unavoidable element of everyday legal practice, there are still perceived diffi-
culties with the use of empathy. Henderson (1987) dispels myths surrounding
empathy, which she deems to interfere with a comprehensive understanding
of the concept. However, it remains useful to consider those myths and the
impact they may have on the willingness of legal professionals to perceive
empathy as part of everyday legal practice.
The first myth, which Henderson sees as the most prolific, is that women are
‘naturally’more empathic than men (1987, p. 1582). While this in itself may not
directly influence the understanding that empathy is inappropriate in legal prac-
tice, it is clear that empathy being perceived as a feminine characteristic is rel-
evant. Henderson cites the work of Gilligan (1993), who highlights an ‘ethic
of care’ which is linked to feminine attributes and invites the connection
between empathy and the “female domain in American society” (1987,
p. 1583). This link between empathy and compassion and caring clashes with
traditional, adversarial notions of legal practice. The legal professions have tra-
ditionally only incorporated masculine traits and therefore empathy is barred
from having a place within legal practice, despite evidence suggesting that
levels of empathy are predicated on previous experience and learning, not
gender (Henderson, 1987).
Another myth Henderson refers to is that empathy “entails a dissolution of
ego boundaries, a loss of self” and results in the legal professional losing perspec-
tive and identifying too much with the client (p. 1584). This is described, for
example, by Gerdy who suggests that “‘too complete identification with the
client’might be harmful” (2008, p. 2). Identification is also discussed by Fletcher
and Weinstein, partly in the above terms. They maintain that it is required in
order for a person to empathise with another, but are particularly mindful of
certain identifications which occur generally where a person “unconsciously
[takes] on the attitudes, behaviours and perspectives of others” (2002, p. 141).
They maintain that in professions which involve “intense interpersonal inter-
action” such as law, the professional is more inclined to take on these identifi-
cations. This, they suggest, can have positive effects in terms of allowing the
legal professional to empathise with a client and therefore enable a deeper
understanding. However, they also note that it can have deleterious effects,
and refer to the situation where objectivity is lost. The legal professional is in
such a position that it is necessary for them to see the situation of a client in
an objective manner “in order to provide the critical eye and assessment that
are part of [the lawyer’s] obligation to him” (ibid.). Therefore, when objectivity
is lost it results in the clouding of professional judgement, meaning that a client
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cannot be represented effectively (Fletcher &Weinstein, 2002). It is evident that,
if empathy does lead to an over-close identification between the legal pro-
fessional and their client, this will raise both practical and ethical issues.
However, Henderson maintains that this form of over-identification is more
commensurate with sympathy than empathy, which she describes as a “flood of
feeling, emotion, pain without a cognitive component” (1987, p. 1584). There-
fore, the problem is not too much empathy, but an over-reliance solely on
emotional or affective empathy or empathy which becomes sympathy. Wispe
encapsulates the difference between empathy and sympathy well when she
explains that:
Sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of another’s plight as something to be
alleviated. Empathy refers to the attempt of one self-aware self to understand the sub-
jective experiences of another self. Sympathy is a way of relating. Empathy is a way of
knowing. (1986, p. 314)
The question therefore becomes “how to reconcile the maintenance of a pro-
fessional boundary with empathic understanding” to avoid empathy becoming
sympathy (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002, p. 142). The knee-jerk answer to this
is arguably to focus on the type of cognitive form of empathy which largely sup-
presses or rejects the idea of any emotional content. However, there are equal
dangers within this approach. Although the discussion above demonstrates
that there are clear beneﬁts to the use of empathy in legal practice, the potentially
strategic, and even manipulative, nature of some of these is also evident (Barton
& Westwood, 2011). If it misses out the emotional base upon which cognitive
empathy should be built and simply becomes a form of marketing tool or a cal-
culated strategy for client retention, it may become more palatable to those
ingrained within traditional notions of ‘thinking like a lawyer’, but it will also
be inauthentic, potentially unethical or immoral and far less effective –
missing the deep and rich insights that a form of empathy based on emotion
can bring to legal analysis and relations (Sanger, 2001; Gerdy, 2008, p. 22;
Gerarda Brown, 2012). Hence, a balance is required between both lower and
upper level empathy when dealing with such situations.
This issue is also arguably connected to the third myth discussed by Henderson
– that empathy always results in “altruistic, helping or caring responses” (1987,
p. 1583). Discussions on this issue, relating to different definitions of empathy,
have noted that empathy may lead to a compassionate response but will not
always do so (Hoffman, 2000; Nussbaum, 2006). This suggests great potential
for both ethical and unethical uses of empathy. If a lawyer chooses to utilise a
form of empathy to manipulate a client (or third party) for their own personal
ends, this is clearly an abuse of their skill. Barkai and Fine (1983) argue that
using empathy in client interaction is not manipulative because it will improve
the lawyer–client relationship and therefore the client’s case, but this assumes
that the lawyer is using their empathic understanding in the client’s best interests.
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Consider the situation, however, where an unscrupulous lawyer seeks to maximise
profit by encouraging a client to prolong an issue or encourages them to reject
cheaper alternatives to litigation. Perhaps more nuanced is the extent to which
lawyers in a commercial and commercialised environment are walking the some-
times thin line between an empathetic approach which is appropriate and effective
and one which becomes inauthentic and ‘false’.5 It is arguable that the antidote to
this is to acknowledge the role of empathy in legal practice further, allowing a full
and nuanced discussion of these type of issue to be conducted. This could allow
empathy to be aligned with wider legal ethics and values, rather than being pigeon-
holed, disregarded as an unchecked impulse or manipulated (consciously or sub-
consciously) for inappropriate ends.
To summarise the key challenges that exist in incorporating empathy into
legal practice, it is clear that both over-emphasising and relying on cognition
have a number of pitfalls. Therefore, the key question is perhaps best framed
as, how can a lawyer preserve objectivity and impartiality in their dealings
with clients without losing the empathic connection?6 In other words, how
can they preserve the benefits of emotional empathy without losing their
sense of self and whilst upholding their legal and ethical duties to the rule of
law? Inter-related with this is the issue of how empathy relates to wider issues
of ethics, values and morality within practice. These are difficult conundrums,
which reflect the wider debate and tensions between an ethic of care and an
ethic of justice within the legal profession (for further discussion on the ethic
of care, see Menkel-Meadow, 1992; Gilligan, 1993; Sommerlad, 2014).
The very fact that empathy can open up and uncover such key issues and ques-
tions, alongside the bridge it offers between cognition and affect, do make it a
potentially valuable construct within legal education and training and the pro-
fession. It is implausible to assume that simply incorporating empathy into
these can provide any single, simple answer to the issues that it raises. As Diner-
stein et al. state, “no framework can be followed blindly. Because the real world is a
world of vast variation and unpredictability” (2004, p. 756). However, the final part
of this article will argue that the best approach to these questions is to introduce the
concept of empathy within law during the formative legal education of potential
lawyers. Doing this will enable them to explore such key themes and issues in a
way that acknowledges the importance and relevance of empathy, whilst ensuring
it does not become simply a shallow, or even meaningless, label.
Introducing empathy through legal education
The existing literature on incorporating empathy into legal education and train-
ing stems almost wholly from the US. In this context, Gerdy (2008) argues that,
when students move into practice, empathy is as important as the intellectual,
analytical skills often taught in the legal classroom. Thus it should be fostered
throughout legal education not only through explanation and examples but
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also opportunities to practise it as a skill in itself. She suggests that this could be
achieved by using drama, self-reflection (for example, using small-group discus-
sions or personal narratives) and the use of role models (for example, practising
lawyers as guest speakers) (see also Watkins, 2011; Beverly, 2014). Juergens
(2005) echoes this last point, suggesting that the most powerful role models
are, in fact, legal academics themselves who can both demonstrate their own
emotions and teach students how to develop these competencies, providing
examples such as demonstrating their pleasure at a student making a positive
contribution or showing their sadness at a particularly harrowing case.
For Gerdy (2008), and also Gallacher (2012), the key appears to be to imbue
an appreciation of the role and relevance of empathy throughout the law school
curriculum as opposed to making it a separate, assessable component of law
school. Other commentators have instead focused on the development of
empathy in a more discrete, explicit manner, through a specific class or
course. For example, O’Carroll, drawing on her own experiences as a public
defence lawyer, suggests that a class on wrongful convictions could assist in
demonstrating to students the value of empathy as possibly ‘the most essential
qualification’ for practice (2006, p. 24). The most detailed account of this
approach is given by Rosenberg (2002), who discusses his experience of devel-
oping and delivering an ‘Interpersonal Dynamics for Lawyers’ course.
His focus in this course is on empathy not only as a tool (such as discussed
above, in relation to client interviewing) but also as a value that “can shape a
person’s experiences, thoughts, and actions in a morally positive way” (2002,
p. 633; see also Hoffman, 2000). Rather than determining a particular moral
code or choice, he argues that factoring it into the thinking process can lead
to better and more accurate decision making (Rosenberg, 2002). He states that
this cannot be done within a lecture-style environment, but mirrors Gerdy
(2008) and Juergens (2005) in essentially arguing for a more experiential type
of learning based on modelling, practice and feedback, with a particular empha-
sis on students themselves facilitating the process in a safe and confidential
setting (Rosenberg, 2002). In this type of scenario, it appears unlikely that
empathy would be explicitly assessed; rather, it could positively influence the
wider judgements, reflections and decisions made by students in their work.
Within the UK, there does not appear to have been any reported, explicit
inclusion of empathy within the law school curriculum. This is perhaps unsur-
prising when the subject of emotion in legal education in general has been “rela-
tively invisible” (Maharg &Maughan, 2011, p. 1). A focus on the development of
specific intellectual abilities (sometimes characterised as ‘thinking like a lawyer’)
has meant anything relating to emotion and the affective domain has been
largely disregarded or suppressed, a pattern which has continued within legal
practice and decision making (James, 2008; Jones, 2017). Although the emer-
gence of the skills agenda in higher education, with its focus on educating for
employability and the knowledge economy, has arguably opened the door for
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some acknowledgement of so-called ‘soft skills’, the implementation of this, at
undergraduate level at least, has been somewhat patchy and uneven (Harris &
Beinart, 2005).7
Indeed, the very split in the UK between the undergraduate law degree and
the vocational stage of training can be seen as problematic in terms of the
acknowledgement and incorporation of empathy. It is arguable that empathy
fits most naturally into the type of client care skills currently taught on the post-
graduate Legal Practice Course (LPC) for aspiring solicitors.8 For example, the
Stage 1 LPC outcomes specifically state that students must demonstrate an
ability to show “sensitivity to issues of culture, diversity and disability in com-
munication with clients, colleagues and others” (SRA, 2011). However, there
also appears to be the danger of empathy treated in this way becoming the
type of instrumental, broad-brush strategy that Margulies (1999) seems to envi-
sage in the time-pressured environment of professional training. It also means
that, for students who have a qualifying law degree, they may well have spent
the preceding three years being socialised into a culture where empathy, particu-
larly in its affective forms, is not valued, something unlikely to be significantly
challenged by a session or two on active listening.9
At undergraduate level, there is a danger that the inclusion of empathy could
become mired in the longstanding tensions between vocational and liberal
approaches to legal education by being viewed as an overly vocational, non-cog-
nitive soft skill or, conversely, treated as only one of a range of client care strat-
egies with no reference to underlying intellectual questions relating to values or
ethical questions.10 Nevertheless, the current status of legal education does
appear to offer some exciting potential for empathy becoming embedded in at
least parts of the UK law school undergraduate curriculum, particularly follow-
ing the LETR’s (2013) call for a greater focus on ethics and professionalism
throughout legal education.
Conclusion
The title to this article asks whether empathy is essential to, or antithetical to,
legal practice. In fact, it is arguable that some degree of empathy is inescapable
as it forms part of everyday legal practice. The question is whether empathy
should be explicitly incorporated into the language and culture of legal pro-
fessionals. A number of challenges have been highlighted, the most obvious
perhaps being the argument, based on an emotional or affective conceptualis-
ation of empathy, that the use of any form of emotive response results in
blurred boundaries and over-identification with the client. In contrast, others
have conceptualised empathy as a purely cognitive process, which may
provide the potential to allow it to be used simply as a form of strategic, or
even manipulative, tool.
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However, acknowledging and incorporating a form of empathy which draws
on both cognitive and emotional processes within legal practice has the potential
to build a powerful bridge between the perceived separation of the affective and
cognitive domains and provides significant benefits to the lawyer–client
relationship. These benefits include enhanced rapport leading to the building
of a genuine and authentic relationship with the client and the enabling of the
legal professional to better understand and meet client needs.
It is also argued that, by incorporating this type of empathy into all stages of
legal education and training, from the undergraduate law degree in the UK
onwards, legal professionals can develop a deeper appreciation of some key
ethical and moral issues and an ability to analyse and reflect on them. Thus,
where empathy and legal professionals meet, there is the opportunity for a
deeper, richer form of practice.
Notes
1. Bloom (2016) refers to empathy as often being characterised in contemporary society
as an “absolute good” (p. 15), which “will save the world” (p. 20). He notes that, at the
time he was writing, there were over fifteen hundred books on Amazon.com with
‘empathy’ in their title. The role and scope of legal practice have become fiercely
debated as a result of regulatory, market and technological changes, leading Susskind
to predict that “the legal world will change more radically over the next two decades
than over the last two centuries” (2013, p. xiii).
2. For a similar summary in the wider scientific literature, see Elliott et al. (2011). Bandes
(1996), however, maintains that even these definitions allow for the inclusion of a
broad range of cognition and behaviour.
3. For arguably the seminal discussion on the law’s treatment of emotion, see Kennedy
(1982).
4. See also the definition of empathy given by Deigh (2011).
5. For a wider discussion of inauthenticity in relation to law and emotion, see Sanger
(2001).
6. Duffy (2010, p. 53) draws a similar distinction between impartiality and neutrality; for
discussion of the relationship between impartiality and detachment in a medical
setting, see Halpern (2001, p. 16).
7. This situation may change with the recognition of the value of soft skills in the
Teaching Excellence Framework (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills,
2016).
8. At the time of writing, consultations are continuing over proposed changes to the
vocational stage of training and the introduction of a centralised Solicitors Qualifying
Examination, but it appears the two-stage model will be retained in some form (SRA,
2016).
9. The discussion of socialisation into a particular law school culture has largely taken
place within the US and Australia. See, for example, Sturm and Guinier (2007),
Brown (2000) and Kennedy (1982). Some of these themes are discussed in a UK
context in Stanley (1988) and Goodrich (1996).
10. For a detailed argument in favour of liberal legal education, see Bradney (2003). For a
more vocationally orientated viewpoint, see Savage and Watt (1996). A number of
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commentators also favour a form of compromise or synthesis between the two (see, for
example, Twining, 1995).
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